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DOCKET NO. 48221-2020
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Boundary County Case
No. CRll-19-0783

V.

MATTHEW K. BROWN,
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Boundary
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STATEMENT OF CASE
(i)

Nature of Case.

Law enforcement made a warrantless search of the
Defendant's blood.

The Defendant moved to suppress the

evidence gathered in the search.

Defendant contends that

the initial warrantless search of the Defendant's blood was
in violation of the State of Idaho and United States
Constitutions and asks the Court to reverse the District
Court and exclude all the evidence.
The Defendant changed his plea from not guilty to
guilty and stipulated to restitution.

The District judge

imposed a sentence that was too harsh.
(ii) Course of Proceedings.

An Information was filed charging the Defendant with
aggravated driving under the influence causing injuries to a
victim in a crash.
A vehicle collision occurred between the Defendant and
another driver in Boundary County, Idaho.

The State police

made a warrantless draw of the Defendant's blood.

The

Blood test results disclosed intoxicating drugs in the
Defendant's person.
The Defendant filed a Motion To Suppress on September
23, 2019 seeking to exclude all of the State's evidence
collected from the blood draw on the basis that all of
evidence was gained as a result of the initial warrantless
search.

Further, the information obtained in the initial
-3-

warrantless search led to the issuance of search warrants.
The Court entered a Memorandum Decision RE: Defendant's
Motion To Suppress and denied the Defendant's Motion to
Suppress.

(R. Vol. II, Pgs. 260-269).

After denial of the Motion to Suppress, the parties
entered into a Plea Agreement where the state agreed to make
certain recommendations.
The Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge
and was sentenced by the District Judge.

The sentence was

too harsh in this case.
(iii)
Statement of Facts.
On September 19, 2018, MATTHEW K. BROWN was involved in
a motor vehicle collision located on U.S. 95 near milepost
504 in Boundary County, Idaho.
After a prolonged extrication time, the unconscious
Defendant was transported to Kootenai Health via Life Flight
in critical condition.
The Defendant, MATTHEW K. BROWN, was admitted to the
ICU at Kootenai Health.
Idaho State Police Master Corporal Charles Robnett was
asked to respond to Kootenai Health to assist with a crash
investigation.

Upon M. Cpl. Robnett's arrival at Kootenai

Health, the Defendant was getting a CAT Scan.

As admitted

in Idaho State Police Supplemental Report C18002238 No. 1,
upon the Defendants return to his room, M. Cpl. Robnett
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asked the nurse to get blood drawn from the unconscious
Defendant.

M. Cpl did not read Idaho Department's ALS form

to the Defendant, nor did M. Cpl. Robnett apply for a
warrant.
After the warrantless blood collection by M. Cpl.
Robnett, he proceeded to take the vials of blood to the
Idaho State Police District One office and booked the blood
into evidence.
A forensic toxicolgy analysis of the warrantless blood
collection interpreted the presence of Methamphetamine,
Amphetamine, Lorazepam, Ketamine, and Fentanyl.
No conversation was had with Mr. Brown.
Idaho State Police Master Corporal Robnett drew and
seized blood withdrawn from the Defendant, MATTHEW K. BROWN,
without a warrant.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
a.

Whether the District Court erred in denying the

Defendant's Motion To Suppress?
b.

Whether the sentence was unreasonable or cruel and

unusual punishment?
ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court should have excluded the evidence
from the warrantless blood draw
-5-

The standard of review of a suppression motion is
bifurcated. When a decision on a suppression motion is
challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact
that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely
review the application of constitutional principles to the
facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916
P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996).
A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable
unless i t falls within certain special and well-delineated
exceptions to the warrant requirement in the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution.
Idaho 906, 174 P.3d 876,

State v. Cruz, 144

(App. 2007).

In the present case, there is no well delineated
exception to the warrant requirement.
If evidence is not seized pursuant to a warrant or a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the
evidence discovered as a result of the warrantless search
must be excluded as the fruit of the poisonous tree. State
v. Zapata-Reyes, 144 Idaho 703, 169 P.3d 291 (App. 2007).
The recent United States Supreme Court case Missouri v.
McNeely, 569 U.S., 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013)
places new limits on the ability of law enforcement to
conduct a blood test without a warrant.
Idaho 416, 337 P.3d 575,
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(2014) .

State v. Wulff, 157

Requiring that a person submit to a blood alcohol test
is a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I Section 17 of the
Idaho Constitution. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). "Like the
Fourth Amendment, the purpose of Art. I , § 17 is to protect
Idaho citizens' reasonable expectation of privacy against
arbitrary governmental intrusion." State v. Holton, 132
Idaho 501, 503, 975 P.2d 789, 791 (1999) .
157 Idaho 416, 337 P.3d 575,

State v. Wulff,

(2014)

The Fourth Amendment provides:

[337 P.3d 578] 157 Idaho

419 The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S.
Const. amend. IV. Warrantless searches and seizures are
presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 454-55, 91 S.Ct.
2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160
P.3d at 741. To overcome this presumption of
unreasonableness, the search must fall within a wellrecognized exception to the warrant requirement. Coolidge,
403 U.S. at 455; Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741.
-7-

Exigency and consent are two well-recognized exceptions to
the warrant requirement. Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct. 1849,
179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011); Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at
741.

State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 337 P.3d 575,

(2014)

Missouri v. McNeely indicates that Idaho cannot use a
per se exigency exception to the warrant requirement based
upon the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream.
State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 337 P.3d 575,

(2014)

McNeely repeatedly indicated that" [w]hether a
warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is
reasonable must be determined case by case based on the
totality of the circumstances." Id. at 1563. Here, the
district court determined that McNeely applied to all
warrantless blood draws, stating" [ McNeely] places new
limits on the ability of law enforcement to conduct a blood
test without a warrant." S tate v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 337
P. 3d 575,

(2014) .

Thus, according to the Court, " [i]n those drunkdriving investigations where police officers can reasonably
obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without
significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the
Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so." Id. After that,
the Court discussed technological advances that allow for
warrants to be processed faster, which also would be
involved in the analysis. Id. at 1561-62. This discussion
-8-

ended with the Court stating, "Whether a warrantless blood
test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be
determined case by case based on the totality of the
circumstances."
575,

State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 337 P.3d

(2014)
In the present case, Trooper Mattilla simply told

dispatch that he would need the Defendant's blood.
Trooper Robnett went to the hospital and did not seek
consent to draw the blood.
Trooper Robnett assumed the Defendant could be taken
away at any time, but did not ask the on duty staff if his
assumption was correct.
Trooper Robnett did not seek a search warrant.
Finally, irrevocable implied consent operates as a per
se rule that cannot fit under the consent exception because
it does not always analyze the voluntariness of that
consent. Voluntariness has always been analyzed under the
totality of the circumstances approach: "whether a consent
to a search was in fact 'voluntary'

. . . is a question of

fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances." Schneckloth v. Bustamente, 412 U.S. 218,
227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Further, the
State has the burden to prove that" consent was, in fact,
freely and voluntarily given." Id. at 222 (quoting Bumper v.
-9-

N. Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d
797 (1968)). Consent is not voluntary if it is" the product
of duress or coercion, express or implied." Schneckloth, 412
U.S. at 227. When the Court has determined whether a
suspect's consent was voluntary or coerced, its decisions"
each reflected a careful scrutiny of all the surrounding
circumstances" and" none of them turned on the presence or
absence of a single controlling criterion." Id. at 226. The
Court has also stated The Fourth Amendment does not
proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it
merely proscribes those which are unreasonable. Thus, we
have long approved consensual searches because it is no
doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once
they have been permitted to do so. The standard for
measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth
Amendment is that of" objective" reasonableness-what would
the typical reasonable person have understood by the
exchange between the officer and the suspect? Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d
297 (1991)

(internal citations omitted). Given that" [t]he

touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness," id.
at 250, and that the United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized a totality of the circumstances
approach is necessary to determine voluntariness for
consent, requiring a totality of the circumstances approach
to determine a driver's consent fits within the Court's
-10-

existing precedent.
575,

State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 337 P.3d

(2014) .
Idaho's implied consent statute was not a valid

exception to the warrant requirement.
Idaho 416, 337 P.3d 575,

State v. Wulff, 157

(2014)

Ample time to seek a warrant for a blood draw existed
in this case.
There is no factual basis upon which the court can
determine that exigence circumstances existed to draw the
blood without a warrant.
Given the totality of the circumstances, the evidence
is the fruit of the illegal search of Defendant by law
enforcement.
The bloodtest results should be excluded.
Kootenai Health medical records should be excluded, its
fruit of the poisonousness tree.
II.

Matt Brown's sentence was too harsh and was
unreasonable and cruel and unusual punishment.

Matt Brown's sentence imposed was unreasonable and
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.
In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we are
exercising our authority as an appellate court to determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v.
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384-85, 582 P.2d 728, 730-31 (1978). In
deciding whether a sentence is cruel and unusual, we must
decide whether it is proportional.
In determining whether
a sentence is excessive or is cruel and unusual punishment,
-11-

we review all the facts and circumstances in the case and
focus on whether the trial court abused its discretion in
fixing the sentence. State v. Stormoen, 103 Idaho 83, 84-85,
645 P.2d 317, 318-19 (1982); State v. Seifart, 100 Idaho
321, 323-24, 597 P.2d 44, 46-47 (1979); Wolfe, 99 Idaho at
384-85, 582 P.2d at 730-31; State v. Prince, 97 Idaho 893,
894, 556 P.2d 369, 370 (1976); State v. Iverson, 77 Idaho
103, 111-12, 289 P.2d 603, 607 (1955).
In Wolfe,
the Court restated the four objectives of criminal
punishment: "(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility
of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrong doing.'' 99 Idaho at 384, 582 P.2d at 730. The Court
pointed out: "Appellate review of a sentence is based on an
abuse of discretion standard." Id. The Court also stated
that the general objectives of sentence review are: (i) to
correct the sentence which is excessive in length, having
regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender, and the protection of the public interest; (ii) to
facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by affording
him an opportunity to assert grievances he may have
regarding his sentence; (iii) to promote respect for law by
correcting abuses of the sentencing power and by increasing
the fairness of the sentencing process; and [814 P.2d 404]
120 Idaho 144 (iv) to promote the development and
application of criteria for sentencing which are both
rational and just. 99 Idaho at 384, 582 P.2d at 730 (quoting
ABA Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences at 7
(Approved Draft 1968)).
State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 814 P.2d 401, (Idaho
1991)
In the present action, this was Matt's first felony.
Matt has demonstrated an ability to rehabilitate his conduct
to fit within the law and demonstrated an ability to remain
clean and sober by taking pretrial testing and not having
any failures of testing.

With substance abuse under

control Matt is not a danger to society.
Matt agreed to pay restitution to the Defendant and
restitution was ordered.

By the District Judge imposing

sentence, the victim will not receive any restitution until
after Matt is released.
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The Sentence is unreasonable and amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment.

CONCLUSION
All evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless
search of Matt Brown's blood should have been excluded.

The

District Court should be reversed and the evidence excluded.
The Sentence was too harsh, is unreasonable and constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30 day of November, 2020.

/s/ Rex A. Finney
Rex A. Finney
Attorney for Appellant
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